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Computational models of learning have proved largely successful in characterizing
potential mechanisms which allow humans to make decisions in uncertain and volatile
contexts. We report here findings that extend existing knowledge and show that a
modified reinforcement learning model, which has separate parameters according to
whether the previous trial gave a reward or a punishment, can provide the best fit to
human behavior in decision making under uncertainty. More specifically, we examined the
fit of our modified reinforcement learning model to human behavioral data in a probabilistic
two-alternative decision making task with rule reversals. Our results demonstrate that
this model predicted human behavior better than a series of other models based on
reinforcement learning or Bayesian reasoning. Unlike the Bayesian models, our modified
reinforcement learning model does not include any representation of rule switches. When
our task is considered purely as a machine learning task, to gain as many rewards
as possible without trying to describe human behavior, the performance of modified
reinforcement learning and Bayesian methods is similar. Others have used various
computational models to describe human behavior in similar tasks, however, we are
not aware of any who have compared Bayesian reasoning with reinforcement learning
modified to differentiate rewards and punishments.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Humans need to identify patterns or regularities in their environ-
ment in order to survive. Such patterns may be hard to discern
due to natural randomness, or noise, in the environment. In
addition, underlying patterns may change unexpectedly, mak-
ing previously learnt behavior inadequate. Yu and Dayan (2005)
made the distinction between expected and unexpected uncertainty
in this regard. Situations in which underlying rules change unpre-
dictably at different intervals are often called volatile (e.g., Behrens
et al., 2007; Bland and Schaefer, 2012). The interaction of these
different forms of uncertainty poses a challenge for successful
learning, and recent research has tried to understand how humans
adapt to such environments (e.g., Hampton et al., 2006; Behrens
et al., 2007).
In this paper, we consider computational models which best
describe human learning under expected uncertainty in a volatile
environment (Bland and Schaefer, 2011). On multiple trials,
participants pressed one of two buttons in response to one of
two visual stimuli. Participants learnt from being rewarded with
points or punished by a deduction of points after each response.
Rewards and punishments were generated according to underly-
ing rules which formed a probabilistic Stimulus-Response associ-
ation, creating expected uncertainty. A volatile environment with
frequent unsignalled switches in Stimulus-Response rules was
contrasted with stable periods with no such switches. Participants
only received win and loss feedback and were not given any
explanation about the rules by which stimulus and feedback were
generated, nor were they told there were such rules.
Within our computational models, we apply different param-
eters in response to a win and a loss. Such a differentiation is
suggested by the neuroscience and psychology of decision mak-
ing. Many studies have explored the concept of loss-aversion
which states that behavior changes more in response to losses than
to gains of similar magnitude (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984).
The wide reporting of loss-aversion has prompted the investiga-
tion into its neural basis. Tom et al. (2007) used fMRI imaging
to investigate responses to theoretical gambles and found brain
regions which showed increasing activity for increasing potential
gains and the same regions decreased in activity as potential losses
increased.
Such studies can give an indication of the brain regions
involved in response to wins and losses, but not the actual mecha-
nisms. The neurotransmitter dopamine produced in the midbrain
affects two different classes of dopamine receptors in the striatum,
which differentially respond to rewards and punishments (see
e.g., Gerfen, 1992). More recently, differential neural responses
to wins and losses have been found more widely than dopamine
receptors in the striatum. Kravitz et al. (2012) found the striatal
dopamine receptors to be part of separate neural pathways for
reward and punishment. The work of Matsumoto and Hikosaka
(2009) suggests that differential responses may occur earlier in
processing, they found evidence for different groups of dopamine
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neurons responding to positive and negative motivation in the
midbrain of primates.
Given their widespread use in similar studies, we used two
machine learning approaches to model human behavior in the
task considered here: Bayesian learning and reinforcement learn-
ing (e.g., Hampton et al., 2006; Behrens et al., 2007). Bayesian
learning requires prior assumptions about the causal structure
of an environment, and when those assumptions are correct,
the performance is optimal given only the information avail-
able up to a trial. Reinforcement learning does not depend on
existing assumptions, but may not be appropriate in changing
environments (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
Despite the strong indications in neuroscience and psychology
of a differential response to reward and punishment, few stud-
ies comparing alternative computational approaches to learning
from experience in dynamic environments have considered sep-
arate effects of reward and punishment, as noted by Yechiam
and Hochman (2013b). Ito and Doya (2009) and Guitart-Masip
et al. (2012) are examples of studies which differentiate learn-
ing from rewards and punishments by fitting different reward
values following a win or a loss rather than using different learn-
ing rates. Although these studies compared alternative learning
mechanisms, neither considered Bayesian models which required
assumptions about the nature of the environment. In a task using
probabilities which were known in advance, Charness and Levin
(2005) compared a Bayesian learning model to reinforcement
learning and found that participants made errors in circum-
stances when the prediction of the two models differed. They
amended the reward structure of the task and found fewer errors,
suggesting that the affect resulting from outcomes plays a big part
in reinforcement learning.
We use computational learning methods to try to explain our
participants’ behavior on a trial by trial basis. For our task, we
find that a modified reinforcement learning model is better able to
account for human behavior than both Bayesian models and stan-
dard reinforcement learning, even after taking into consideration
the number of free parameters in each model. Our modifica-
tion to reinforcement learning differentiates learning according
to whether the participant won or lost on the previous trial (WL
model). Despite significant between-subjects variability in task
performance and differences in experimental conditions, we find
that each participant’s behavior can be described by an individual
set of learning parameters which remain constant over all trials.
In addition, we find significant differences between the fit values
for the parameters after a win and those after a loss. Earlier mod-
eling work on a similar task predicts that learning rates change
in response to feedback given (Behrens et al., 2007). In our par-
ticular task, we could explain human behavior without variable
learning rates.
Our WL model has four parameters: learning rate after a win
and loss and temperature after a win and a loss. The temperature
allows for variability between participants in the probability of
responding in accordance with the current underlying belief. For
most participants we find a higher learning rate after a win than a
loss, and a higher temperature after a loss than a win. These four
parameters can be interpreted as a characterization of the par-
ticipant’s individual strategy. Interestingly, when we consider the
task just as a computational challenge without aiming to model
human behavior, we find that our WL model is just as good as
Bayesian models at the task. The WL model is significantly better
at the task than standard reinforcement learning.
We are aware that the experimental paradigm reflects a rel-
atively simple task in terms of real world problems. In many
other tasks reinforcement learning strategies will not do so well.
A three-choice task would already require more exploration, for
example. Nevertheless, the task is interesting as a minimal model
of changing rules in a noisy environment. It is clear that after
differentiating between a win and a loss, reinforcement learning
strategies do very well on our task, and a further exploration of
similar tasks would be very interesting.
2. RESULTS
2.1. HUMAN BEHAVIOR
In this task, participants were repeatedly shown a series of col-
ored triangles, red or blue, on a screen, and they were required
to press one of two buttons in response to each triangle. They
received monetary reward or punishment according to whether
this response was correct or wrong. To analyze the behavior, we
encoded each response according to underlying behavioral types,
where type 1 behavior was to press button one when a red trian-
gle was shown, and button two for blue; type 2 was the opposite
of type 1. Over groups of consecutive trials, one response type
was rewarded on the majority of trials, controlled by two levels
of probability (73% and 83%) known as feedback validity (FV),
giving expected uncertainty in the environment. For a set of tri-
als in which response type 1 was rewarded the most, we say that
the underlying experimental rule was rule 1, likewise for type 2
responses and rule 2. Stimuli were presented in blocks of 120 tri-
als having constant FV and one of two levels of volatility. High
volatility blocks had a rule switch every 30 trials, stable blocks
had the same underlying rule for all 120 trials. The participants
were not given any information about the generation of rewards
or the split of the task into blocks. This data has been examined
previously, without considering the fit of different learning mod-
els to the behavior (Bland and Schaefer, 2011). Further details of
the study can be found in the Materials and Methods section or
Bland and Schaefer (2011).
Figure 1 illustrates the study by showing responses made and
feedback given for the first 120 trials of the study for four individ-
ual participants. Participants were most likely to switch from one
response type to the other after negative feedback, that is a loss of
points.
If the underlying rule can be identified from the pattern of
rewards, but the result on individual trials cannot be predicted
due to the randomness in reward generation, then to achieve
the greatest rewards one should always respond according to the
underlying rule, we call this maximizing. So if one knows that
type 1 responses are rewarded mostly, then one should make a
type 1 response every trial and ignore occasional losses. This does
not consider how to identify which response is being rewarded
most, or how to identify a rule switch. We quantify partici-
pants’ behavior by calculating the percentage of trials in which
each participant’s response is of the type which is associated
with the underlying experimental rule. Individual differences in
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FIGURE 1 | Sequence of responses (a type 1 response is to press button
one when a red triangle is shown and button two for blue, with type 2
the opposite) given by four participants for the first 120 trials of the
study which had probabilistic feedback. Responses which were positively
rewarded (won points) are shown by green diamonds and responses which
were penalized (lost points) are shown as red circles. The underlying
experimental rule was rule 1 (responses of type 1 were rewarded the majority
of the time) in the unshaded periods, and rule 2 in the shaded periods.
responding to the task gave a range of maximizing behavior from
62% to 89% (mean 74.5%, SD 6%). The overall average feedback
validity used in the experiment was 78%, so the average maximiz-
ing was just below that. This is in line with many other studies
which find that in probabilistic tasks, the average frequency of
each response matches the frequency of reward allocation, known
as probability matching (see e.g., Vulkan, 2000; Shanks et al.,
2002).
2.2. COMPUTATIONAL MODELING
Reinforcement learning models are based on standard reinforce-
ment learning techniques of making trial by trial adjustments to
the predicted value of a particular action, which is a prediction
of how much reward is expected from that action. This predicted
value is adjusted according to the outcome and a learning rate
which controls how much influence the latest outcome has in
changing the predicted value of an action. We considered three
alternative reinforcement learning models, two of these, standard
reinforcement learning model (RL) and win loss modified rein-
forcement learning model (WL), assume that the environment is
fully coupled. This assumes that responses can be viewed in terms
of the two response types described above, with the red triangle
requiring the opposite response from blue, allowing us to ignore
the actual color presented on each trial, and also that exactly one
of the responses will be rewarded on each trial. This means that, if
feedback shows that one response type is incorrect, then the other
response type would have been correct on that trial and vice versa,
so regardless of which response is made, feedback lets you know
how each response type would have fared.
The assumption that the participants expected the environ-
ment to be coupled was motivated by the instructions given
to participants, but to validate this assumption, we tested an
uncoupled reinforcement learning model (UNC) which consid-
ers the colors seen and the button presses to be independent of
each other and a separate predicted value is maintained for each
combination of button and color. Given the assumption of inde-
pendence, feedback after making a response does not give you
any information about the result of pressing the other button or
seeing the other color.
In our UNC and RL models, one learning rate is assumed for
each participant. Our win loss modified reinforcement learning
model (WL) allows wins and losses to have different influences
on learning by allocating two learning rates to each participant,
treating trials following a loss or a win separately.
Our Bayesian models are based on hidden Markov models
which assume that rewards are governed by a hidden envi-
ronmental state which cannot be directly observed but can be
inferred. In our simple hidden Markov model (HMM), as with
Hampton et al. (2006), the hidden state has two possible val-
ues, which are equivalent to the two experimental rules. Given
the structure of the HMM and the outcomes, combination of
response type made and feedback received, Bayesian reasoning is
used to determine a probability of reward for each response type.
Two sets of probabilities define the structure of the HMM, these
are taken to be constant parameters for each participant. These
probabilities control the chance of a rule switch and the relation
between the hidden state and the reward.
Following the work of Behrens et al. (2007), we created a
Bayesian model (VOL) which assumes an additional level of
structure to the environment, volatility, or how quickly the
environment is changing. As with Behrens et al. (2007), a hidden
state relates directly to the probability of reward for a particular
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response, in our case representing the probability of response
type 2 being rewarded, without the assumption in the HMM of
only two states. This gives a flexible model which can respond to
any change in state including changes in feedback validity. Like
Behrens et al. (2007) we have assumed that the process for deter-
mining the current state and volatility does not vary between
participants.
In all models, following the calculation of a belief or probabil-
ity, we apply softmax action selection to determine the probability
of making each action on each trial. Softmax action selection
assumes that the chosen action depends on the difference between
the values associated with each action and on a temperature
parameter controlling the amount of randomization of responses
on top of underlying beliefs. A low temperature increases the
probability of choosing the higher valued action and a high
temperature makes the probability of each action more similar.
For the RL and UNC models we fit one temperature parameter
to each participant’s behavior, for the other models we fit two
temperature parameters, differentiating trials following wins and
losses.
Given a set of parameters and a model, we calculate a prob-
ability for each action on each trial for the outcomes received
by the participant. The natural logarithms of the probabilities
for the actions actually taken are summed for each participant.
For each model, parameters are fit to each participant’s behav-
ior by searching possible values to maximize the likelihood of
the parameters over all trials, for more details see Materials and
Methods.
2.3. COMPARING MODEL FIT
Models with more parameters should be able to show a
closer fit to the data so it is customary to penalize mod-
els with more free parameters which have been fit to partic-
ipants’ behavior (Mars et al., 2012). To do this, we compare
the five models described above by calculating the commonly
used Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for each model
(Lewandowsky and Farrell, 2011).
As a better model has a lower BIC value, Table 1 shows that the
WL model gave the best overall fit to the data. We also examined
the BIC for each model calculated separately for each participant.
The UNC model was the worst fit to behavior compared to the
other models for all participants. The best fit model was the WL
model for 24 of the 30 participants, for four participants the best
fit was the RL model and for two the HMM. Of the 24 participants
for whom the WL model was the best fit, 23 had HMM as the
next best fit. The differences in the BIC between the WL model
FIGURE 2 | Bayes factors for the difference between the WL and HMM
models, calculated for each participant shown by a red circle.
and each other model were statistically significant, p < 0.001 in
each case, t(29) = 5.05, 4.25, and 7.48 for comparison of WL to
RL, HMM, and VOL models, respectively.
As described by Lewandowsky and Farrell (2011), we calcu-
lated Bayes factors for the difference between the HMM and
WL models, we did this using the calculated BIC for each par-
ticipant. Bayes factors can give an indication of the size of an
effect, Lewandowsky and Farrell (2011) report previously pro-
posed guidelines that a Bayes factor above 10 implies strong
evidence for one model over the other, and between 3 and 10
implies moderate evidence. Figure 2 shows the Bayes factors for
the WL compared to HMM for all participants.
The HMM and WL models fit the participants’ behavior bet-
ter than the other models so we now focus on these two models.
Having used all trials to determine the best fit parameters for
each participant and model, we could now calculate a trial by
trial probability of making a type 2 response. Figure 3 shows these
probabilities for the HMM and WL models for three participants
for the first 240 trials of the study. In general, the probabilities
match closely, but where there is a difference, the WL model is
usually closer to the actual response made by the participant. This
follows from the use of log likelihood to find the best model,
Figure 3 is an illustration.
As the WL model was the best fit to behavior, we look at
the values of the fit parameters. Figure 4 shows the fit parame-
ters for the WL model, the temperature was significantly higher
after a loss than a win, t(29) = 5.61, p < 0.0001 with means of
0.87 and 0.35 after a loss and a win, respectively. According
to this model, participants were more likely to randomize their
responses after a loss. The fit learning rates were significantly
higher after a win than after a loss, means of 0.77 and 0.52, respec-
tively, t(29) = 4.52, p < 0.0001. A lower learning rate after a loss
implies that losses are treated less strongly, which allows behav-
ior to respond more slowly to occasional negative feedback and
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FIGURE 3 | Probability of a type 2 response calculated by HMM
and WL models using the parameters fit to behavior by three
participants for the first 240 trials of the study. Unshaded areas
indicate that, experimentally, rule 1 applied and shaded areas that
rule 2 applied. The participants’ responses are shown as 1 for
type 2 responses, and 0 for type 1, responses which were
rewarded are shown as green diamonds and those which were
penalized as red circles.
FIGURE 4 | Values of the fit parameters after a win and after a loss for
each participant for the WL model. Left: Learning rate. Right:
Temperature. In each plot, a line is shown to indicate equality of the fit
parameters after a win and after a loss.
so take advantage of stable periods by not switching to the oppo-
site response type when occasionally losing points when using the
most likely response. Finally, we broke down the BIC scores for
the WL model between a win and a loss. We find some indica-
tions that the WL model fits best after a loss, but this is at the edge
of significance (p = 0.054).
2.4. PARAMETER RECOVERY
If the fit parameters are reliable, we should be able to take
simulated data, with known parameters, and accurately esti-
mate those parameters (Lewandowsky and Farrell, 2011). For
each model, we chose parameters to represent “typical par-
ticipants” and used the model’s learning rules to generate
two sets of simulated responses to each participant’s observed
FIGURE 5 | Parameters estimated by the WL model for data simulated
using the WL model with parameter values as shown by crosses. Left:
Learning rate. Right: Temperature. Lines show equality of the parameters
after a win and after a loss.
outcomes. We used the same process as for the original par-
ticipant responses to estimate parameters for the simulated
responses.
Figure 5 shows that the fit parameters for the WL model are
clustered around the parameters used for data generation which
are shown by crosses suggesting that the parameters are reliable.
The left of Figure 6 shows the parameters representing prob-
abilities in the structure of the HMM fit to participant behavior
and on the right the parameters fit to data generated using the
HMM with parameter values shown by crosses. If the partici-
pants had understood the experimental generation of outcomes
and were applying that knowledge, we would expect the fit param-
eters to be close to those approximating the generation of data,
shown in the left of Figure 6 by a cross.
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FIGURE 6 | Left: Parameters fit to participant data for the HMM with the
parameters to match the experimental generation of data shown by a
cross. Right: Parameter values chosen to generate responses using the
HMM are shown by crosses. Parameter estimates for the generated data
are shown as dots. The probability of switch uses the assumption in the
HMM that the environment switches from one in which rule 1 applies to
rule 2 applies, and vice versa, with the same constant probability. The error
probability is the probability of negative feedback when using the response
type corresponding to the environmental rule which applies.
For the HMM, the spread of fit parameters away from the data
generation parameters shows that the parameters are not well
recovered. In particular, for several participants the fit value for
the error probability was 0.49, that is the probability of losing
when using the response type associated with the current rule.
Fitting parameters to data generated with this parameter value,
the estimated parameter values covered the whole range of feasi-
ble values. For the data generated with parameters closer to the
actual experimental data, the fit parameters are not so widely
spread.
2.5. MODEL RECOVERY
We found that the WL model was the best fit to participant data
of the models tested. If model fitting is carried out on simu-
lated data, the best fit model should be that which generated
the data. Using the simulated data from the parameter recovery
testing described above, we compared the fit of each model as in
the analysis of participant data. Table 2 shows the percentage of
simulations using each model which were best fit by each model.
The correct model has been identified in most cases for all of the
models.
The largest incorrect identification was the finding that the
RL model was the best fit for 18.8% of the simulations by the
HMM. The wrongly identified simulations were those which had
the parameter for the error probability set to 0.49, and the prob-
ability of a switch set to 0.35. This was also the set of parameters
which could not be reliably recovered from the simulated data
as described above. A simulation using these parameters always
gives probabilities close to 0.5 for each response with slight pref-
erence in line with the most recent outcome. Reinforcement
learning produces responses in line with the most recent out-
come by setting the learning rate to one, and the probabilities
remain close to 0.5 by setting a high value for temperature.
In this way the same behavior can be achieved by the HMM
and RL models. Using BIC to compare models, RL will be pre-
ferred as the RL model has two parameters compared to four for
the HMM.
Table 2 | Percentage of best fit models to simulations using each of
the models.
Simulated model
RL WL HMM VOL
Fit model RL 99.6 8.6 18.8 0
WL 0.4 86.0 1.6 0
HMM 0 5.1 78.5 0.8
VOL 0 0.3 1.1 99.2
2.6. HOW WELL CAN THESE LEARNING METHODS DO?
Human behavior was best fit by the WL model, we now con-
sider how the models compare when carried out by an ideal
agent. By ideal agent, we mean an agent which always selects the
action which the model suggests is most likely to give a reward,
and the model parameters are chosen to give the highest num-
ber of rewards for the task. We used the sequence of outcomes
received by each participant in the task and then considered the
performance of each model on each participant’s trials.
For the RL and WL models, these parameters were found by a
grid search over all possible values of the learning rates at inter-
vals of 0.01. For the WL model, a learning rate after a win of 0.48
and after a loss of 0.24 maximized rewards. A learning rate of 0.2
gave maximum rewards for the RL model. The WL model won
significantly more rewards than the RL model t(30) = 3.53, p =
0.0014.
For the HMM, we searched the parameter space in the region
of those parameters approximating the generative environment to
find the best performance. The generative environment had equal
blocks with FV of 83% and 73%, giving an average probability of
22% of losing when using the response associated with the rule,
the error probability. For the probability of a rule switch we used
a probability of 0.021 based on 5 switches in 240 trials, having
switches after 120 or 30 trials. The parameters which maximized
rewards were 0.021 for the switch probability and 0.2 for the
error probability. There was no significant difference between the
performance of the WL and HMM models t(30) = 1, p = 0.33.
The HMM was significantly better than the VOL model, t(30) =
4.98, p < 0.0001.
Figure 7 shows the maximizing behavior, aligned with the
experimental rule, of the ideal WL model in comparison to that
of the participants. The percentage of responses in line with the
underlying experimental rule were averaged over all participants
and the ideal WL model for trials following rule switches, with
each of the levels of feedback validity (FV) shown separately. The
ideal WL has parameter values which optimize behavior over all
trials, not just volatile blocks. The ideal WL model far outper-
forms the participants and reaches a steady level of maximizing at
100% in the high FV condition.
As well as being able to outperform humans, the WL model
can also closely simulate human behavior. Ten sets of simu-
lated responses were generated using the WL models with the
fit parameters and the sequence of outcomes for each indi-
vidual participant. Figure 7 shows that the simulations closely
replicate the aggregate performance of the participants. Although
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FIGURE 7 | Maximizing after a switch for the best parameters for the
WL model (WL ideal, red line) compared to the percentage of
maximizing responses by participants (dashed cyan line). The WL
simulation uses parameters fit to each participant’s behavior.
only volatile blocks are shown, the parameters used in the sim-
ulations were those fit to participant behavior across all trials
regardless of the experimental conditions. Maximizing behav-
ior of participants and simulations quickly adapts to a rule
switch and reaches a plateau which is approximately equal to
the level of feedback validity (probability matching). For trials
21–30 following a switch in the high feedback validity (FV =
83%) condition, participants showed maximizing of 82% and
the WL simulation 81%. In the low feedback validity condition
(FV = 73%), maximizing by participants and the WL model
was 73%.
3. DISCUSSION
We find that a reinforcement learning model with separate
parameters after a win or a loss (WL) gives a significantly better
description of human behavior in a two-alternative probabilistic
learning task with rule reversals than the other models tested. Our
VOL model, implementing the model of Behrens et al. (2007),
is flexible and able to adapt to changes in the level of expected
uncertainty, or feedback validity (FV), and volatility. However,
the WL model is a better fit than the others although it has con-
stant parameters throughout all trials. Behrens et al. (2007), in
a broadly similar decision making task, found their model to be
a better fit to human behavior than reinforcement learning with
constant parameters for each participant or separate parameters
for volatile and stable blocks. The difference between the fit of our
WL model and standard reinforcement learning (RL) applies even
when they are compared using a method that penalizes the WL
model. In particular, the advantage of the WL model was observed
when the BIC of the models was compared, a method which
strongly penalizes models with higher numbers of parameters
such as our WL model (Lewandowsky and Farrell, 2011).
Comparing the performance of ideal agents on our task, we
find no significant difference between the HMM and WL mod-
els. Ideal agents have parameters which are chosen to maximize
rewards given the model and always choose the option given by
the model as the most favorable. Bayesian models are constructed
to make optimal decisions, providing that the assumptions under-
lying the models are correct. Although the assumptions of the
Bayesian models are based on the experimental structure used
to generate rewards, the HMM or VOL models do not outper-
form the WL model on our task although the WL model does not
adjust its learning rate to accommodate different levels of unex-
pected uncertainty and volatility. There is a small but significant
improvement in performance of the WL model compared to the
RL model when using ideal agents. All of the models, when used
by ideal agents, far outperform human behavior.
In our WL model, we find that for both the learning rate and
temperature parameters, there is a significant difference between
the fit parameter values following a win and a loss. These differ-
ences are consistent with psychological studies reporting behav-
ioral differences in response to wins and losses and with existing
neuroscientific knowledge indicating the existence of different
neural pathways linked to the processing of wins and losses (see
e.g., Kravitz et al., 2012; Yechiam and Hochman, 2013b).
In psychology, the concept of loss-aversion, which suggests
that behavior changes more in response to losses than to gains of
similar magnitude (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984) has prompted
much investigation. As an alternative mechanism to loss-aversion,
Yechiam and Hochman (2013b) proposed a loss-attention mech-
anism in which losses cause participants to attend more closely to
a task and so losses decrease the amount of randomization.
These ideas of loss-aversion are often tested in studies of
response to risk, that is where participants choose between alter-
natives with known outcome probabilities. An example (from
Kahneman and Tversky, 1984) is a choice between a safe or
risky option, where the risky option has an 85% chance of win-
ning $1000 and a 15% chance of winning nothing and the safe
option pays out $800 with certainty. People tend to prefer the
safe option. In their examination of the loss-attention hypothesis,
Yechiam and Hochman (2013a), used several tasks which involved
repeated selections between a safe and a risky option where the
probabilities had to be learnt from experience. They tested their
loss-attention model by fitting a choice sensitivity parameter, the
inverse of our temperature parameter, for each task. They found
less randomization of responses in tasks in which losses were pos-
sible compared to tasks without losses. In our task, unlike that of
Yechiam and Hochman (2013a), the participants could not avoid
losses as there was no way to predict the outcome on individual
trials. We find a higher temperature after individual losses, imply-
ing that participants are less likely to follow the underlying belief
after a loss. This does not necessarily conflict with the idea of loss-
attention, as adding randomness to a response after a loss may be
a mechanism for testing an underlying belief without making a
large adjustment to that belief.
In neuroscience, dopamine is related to reward and punish-
ment and separate D1 and D2 dopamine receptors in the basal
ganglia have been found to respond to reward and punishment,
respectively (see e.g., Gerfen, 1992). This inspired the use of
separate pathways to respond to reward and punishment in the
computational neural models of reinforcement learning by Frank
and colleagues (see e.g., Frank, 2005; Samson et al., 2010). Testing
this, Kravitz et al. (2012) found different pathways in the striatum
of mice to be involved in processing reward and punishments.
Rather than indicating reward and punishment directly, Schultz
and colleagues suggested that dopamine signals the difference
between an expected reward and that actually received (see e.g.,
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Schultz, 1998). This difference forms the prediction error which
is calculated in reinforcement learning.
Following their neural models with separate pathways for
learning after a win and a loss, (see e.g., Frank, 2005; Samson
et al., 2010). Frank et al. (2007) use separate learning rate param-
eters following a win and a loss when using a reinforcement
learning model to analyze human behavior in a probabilistic task.
Like us, they find that the mean learning rate following a win
is higher than that after a loss. They use just one temperature
parameter and, as they are looking at associations between genet-
ics and reinforcement learning parameters, they do not compare
alternative models of behavior.
We are aware of only a few studies that have considered
separate effects of reward and punishment when comparing alter-
native computational models of learning from experience, none
of which compare Bayesian models which make assumptions
about the nature of the environment. These studies are based on
different learning tasks to ours, and fit different reward values fol-
lowing a win or a loss (e.g., Ito and Doya, 2009; Guitart-Masip
et al., 2012). Guitart-Masip et al. (2012) had four fractal images
which signalled whether participants should respond or not to
gain rewards or avoid punishments, these associations had to be
learnt from experience and there was no switch in associations.
Guitart-Masip et al. (2012) fit a number of different reinforce-
ment learning models to behavior, the best fit model did not
scale rewards and punishments differently. Analyzing the deci-
sions of rats in two-stage probabilistic decisions, Ito and Doya
(2009) found that a reinforcement learning model with differ-
ent reward values after a win and a loss was a better fit to the
rats’ behavior than reinforcement learning without differentia-
tion between wins and losses. To maintain the symmetry of the
task in which exactly one response is correct on each trial, we have
taken a different approach and fit a separate learning rate, rather
than reward value, following wins and losses.
As our Bayesian and reinforcement learning based models
make different assumptions about the environment, comparing
the fit of different models to human behavior can give insights
into the assumptions people make about the environment. Our
HMM, as with that of Hampton et al. (2006), as well as assum-
ing that the two outcomes are coupled, assumes that there will
be rule switches within probabilistic feedback. Our VOL model
not only assumes that there will be rule switches, but also that
the frequency of switches depends on the level of volatility in
the environment. Hampton et al. (2006) compared a hidden
Markov model to a reinforcement learning model that made no
assumptions about the structure of the environment. They con-
cluded that participants make assumptions about the structure of
the environment. We also found that our hidden Markov model
(HMM) was a better fit to behavior than a reinforcement learn-
ing model which did not assume that the outcomes were coupled.
This uncoupled reinforcement learning model, however, was not
as good a fit as our RL and WL models. From this we conclude
that participants made some assumptions about the environment
but have no evidence that they adjusted their rate of learning to
the structure of the environment.
Bayesian models can optimize the number of rewards received
when the assumed structure for the Bayesian inference exactly
matches the underlying structure of the task. We examined the
performance of our models when, rather than being fit to human
behavior, the model parameters were selected to maximize the
total reward achieved, we refer to this as an ideal agent using
the model. In our task, the rewards obtained by an ideal agent
using the WL model were not significantly different to those of the
ideal HMM. Our ideal HMM has parameters to closely resemble
the generative structure, but assumes that there is a small con-
stant probability of a rule switch. In the experimental data, rule
switches only occurred at the ends of blocks of 30 or 120 trials.
The HMM also assumes that for each environmental state, there
is a constant probability of each outcome. However, the experi-
mental data was generated using two levels of FV, with outcomes
randomized to give the correct proportion within a block. We
do not believe that these differences between the generative pro-
cess and the assumptions of the HMM significantly hamper the
performance of the HMM. We believe that the ideal agent using
the WL model is approaching an optimal level of response in
this task. The ideal WL model had a small but significant advan-
tage over the ideal RL model in our task. Our ideal HMM also
performed significantly better than our VOL model, our imple-
mentation of the model of Behrens et al. (2007). The VOL model
is more flexible in the situations in which it can learn.
The parameters for the ideal WL model, those which gave the
best performance in the task, were learning rates of 0.48 after a
win and 0.24 after a loss. Our participants also had significantly
higher learning rates after a win than a loss, although generally
higher than the ideal parameters, with means of 0.76 and 0.52
after a win and a loss, respectively.
Learning under expected uncertainty with volatility is not sim-
ple as indicated by the range of participants’ responses. However,
our task, having coupled outcomes in which one or the other
response is correct, does not require any exploration, or trying the
different alternatives to see if things have changed. We expected
the participants to know that if the button press was incorrect,
then the other button would have been correct. Exploration is an
important feature of learning from experience (see e.g., Cohen
et al., 2007). Tasks which have more than two options automat-
ically require exploration, as negative feedback does not show
what would have been the correct response. It will accordingly
be more difficult to learn when there are more alternatives. It has
been acknowledged that standard reinforcement algorithms are
not suitable in complex situations in which there may be many
possible states or actions (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2009). Wilson and
Niv (2012) compared optimal performance between a Bayesian
and non-Bayesian model in their probabilistic learning task and
the Bayesian model clearly had superior performance. Our find-
ing that our ideal WL reinforcement learning model performs
as well as our HMM may be restricted to the case of coupled
two alternative tasks. Additionally, the level of feedback validity
might affect the relative performance of the different styles of
responding. These issues remain to be investigated.
We assumed that whatever decision making processes the par-
ticipants use to make their responses, these remain constant for
the whole task. We have assumed that the task instructions give
participants enough information to form a model. Some studies
have found that a Bayesian model is a better fit to human behavior
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only in conditions when participants have been told to expect
changes in rule (Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts, 2011; Wilson
and Niv, 2012). In our study, participants were not given such
information. The instructions given to participants can affect
behavior in other ways, Taylor et al. (2012) found that proba-
bility matching was influenced by whether participants had an
explanation for the probabilistic outcomes.
In summary, we conclude that, with distinctions between
learning from a win and a loss, reinforcement learning provides a
very good description of the participant responses to repeated tri-
als under expected uncertainty and volatility. It is able to account
for individual differences with parameters that remain constant
throughout all trials although the feedback validity and volatil-
ity varied. Future research should explore whether the differential
treatment of a win and a loss would lead to a similar robust
performance in other experimental situations.
4. MATERIALS AND METHODS
4.1. BEHAVIORAL MEASUREMENTS
Here we give a brief outline of the methods used for record-
ing the behavioral data, for full details see Bland and Schaefer
(2011). The sample of this study was formed by thirty-one par-
ticipants (mean age = 24, SD = 4.99), 18 of whom were female.
The study was approved by the local Ethics committee and par-
ticipants gave written informed consent. For this computational
analysis, we have excluded one participant whose behavioral per-
formance showed maximizing at less than 55%. Participants were
told that they started with 1000 points and would win or lose
points according to their responses and that they would earn a
payment based on their final points total. On each trial, partici-
pants were shown a colored triangle and had to respond to this
stimulus by pressing one of two buttons. They were instructed,
“This triangle will be either blue or red and your key press should
be a guess about which is the right answer in response to the tri-
angle. You will learn which is the correct answer.” There are no
explicit instructions on whether the responses were coupled or
uncoupled. However, the structure of the task is such that accurate
performance is not attainable without learning that the responses
are complementary. The levels of performance that we observed
are a demonstration that participants were not assuming that
responses were uncoupled (and a demonstration that probably
most of them were learning very quickly that the responses were
coupled).
Participants were given immediate on screen feedback as to
whether they were correct and had won 10 points, were wrong
and lost 10 points or were too slow to respond (over 1500 ms)
and also lost 10 points. Participants were not told about under-
lying rules regarding rewards, or given any indication of changes
in experimental condition, and were not given a running total of
points. They were asked to try to win as many points as possible.
The environment could be considered to have a current under-
lying rule which was manipulated by the experimenters. Rule 1
meant that responses of type 1 were rewarded on the majority
of trials, where type 1 responses were to press button one when
shown the red triangle and button two for blue, so rule 1 is an
association between red and button one. Similarly, rule 2 meant
that responses of type 2 were rewarded on the majority of trials,
where type 2 responses were to press button one when shown a
blue triangle and button two for red. Responses were rewarded
at two different probabilities or levels of feedback validity (FV)
which remained constant through blocks of 120 trials. In high FV
blocks, responses in line with the current rule were rewarded on
83.3% of trials, and in low FV blocks this was 73.3% with the
actual outcome on individual trials randomized to meet these
percentages. Two levels of volatility for a block gave two different
frequencies of switches, in stable blocks, the environmental rule
was constant for all 120 trials. In volatile blocks, the rule switched
every 30 trials. Having two rules, two levels of FV and two levels
of volatility gave eight conditions which were presented in blocks
of 120 trials. All participants experienced all conditions but in a
randomized order.
4.2. UPDATING BELIEFS
4.2.1. Reinforcement learning models
4.2.1.1. Uncoupled Reinforcement Learning (UNC).
Reinforcement learning considers the predicted value of, or
rewards which will be obtained by taking a particular action.
In our uncoupled reinforcement learning, four separate action
values are maintained, for each combination of color seen and
button pressed. The reward value is taken to be 1 for a win and
0 for a loss. At each trial a prediction error, δ(t), is calculated as
the difference between the reward and the predicted value of the
response made to the color shown as follows
δ(t) = R(t) − Qi(t),
where Qi(t) represents the predicted value of the response made
to the color shown. This prediction error, δ(t), is used to update
the expected value Qi(t) for the next trial, using a learning rate, α,
with a value between 0 and 1 as follows
Qi(t + 1) = Qi(t) + αδ(t).
All Qj(t) for color and button combinations not experienced on
that trial are maintained for the next trial, without any forgetting.
Each participant was considered to have one constant value for α
regardless of the color and button combination being updated.
4.2.1.2. Standard Reinforcement Learning (RL). In this form of
reinforcement learning, we consider the colors and buttons to be
opposites, and use the response types as described above, in this
formulation, every trial gives full information about each possible
action and so only one predicted value needs to be maintained.
Suppose Q1(t) is the predicted value of using response type 1, on
trial t and that R(t) is the reward associated with response type 1.
We encode the reward, R, according to whether the feedback was
a win or a loss, ignoring the actual number of points won and
lost, by setting R to 1 if a response of type 1 was rewarded on
that trial and set to 0 otherwise. This meant that Q1(t) could take
values between 0 and 1, as the maximum reward which could be
expected on a trial was 1. As we assume that the situation was
coupled and each trial can result in a win or a loss, on trials when
response type 2 is carried out, we take the opposite feedback to
be that related to response type 1. At each trial a prediction error,
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δ(t), is calculated as the difference between the reward and the
predicted value of a type 1 response as follows
δ(t) = R(t) − Q1(t).
This prediction error, δ(t), is used to update the expected value of
a type 1 response for the next trial, using a learning rate, α, with a
value between 0 and 1 as follows
Q1(t + 1) = Q1(t) + αδ(t).
The learning rate determines how quickly new information is
incorporated into beliefs. A learning rate of 1 results in only the
most recent trial being taken into account. As there is no rea-
son to expect one response type to be better than the other at
the start of the trials, the initial value for Q1(t) is set to 0.5. As
Q1(t) is always between 0 and 1 and the two response types are
opposites, the expected value for a type 2 response is calculated as
Q2(t) = 1 − Q1(t).
In our standard reinforcement learning (RL) model, the learn-
ing rate, α, is considered to be a constant for each individual and
was determined by parameter fitting as described below.
4.2.1.3. Win loss modified reinforcement learning (WL). In this
model, the predicted values for responding in accordance with
each rule are calculated exactly as for standard reinforcement
learning but in the WL model, each participant is assumed to have
two different learning rates which apply according to whether
they received a reward or punishment on the previous trial.
4.2.2. Bayesian models
4.2.2.1. Hidden Markov model. To derive the calculations used in
the Bayesian models, we use random variables to denote aspects
of the task. A random variable is one which can exist in one of a
finite number of mutually exclusive states. The outcome on trial t
in the study is represented by the random variable Yt and has two
possible values for the two response types which can be rewarded.
We use the notation P to denote a set of probabilities, so P(Yt)
represents a probability for each value which Y can take. These
sets of probabilities can be represented as column vectors, so for
example for Y , ( ab ) can indicate that there is a probability a that a
type 1 response is rewarded and b that type 2 is rewarded. We use
yt as shorthand for Yt = y where y is the known (but arbitrary)
value taken by Y on trial t. When an outcome has been observed,
then the probability becomes 1 for one response type and 0 for
the other, so yt can be represented by ( 10 ) or (
0
1 ).
The hidden Markov model (HMM) used in this work is
broadly based on the work of Hampton et al. (2006). This model
assumes that the outcome on each trial depends only on the value
of a hidden state at that trial. At trial t the hidden state is rep-
resented by Xt and has two possible values, denoted by xi where
i can be 0 or 1. In each state one of the two response types is
rewarded the majority of the time. In this model, the hidden state
only depends on its value at the previous trial and on the set of
constant probabilities, P(Xt |Xt−1), for staying in the same state or
switching. Given a hidden state, there is assumed to be a constant
probability for each possible outcome y, this set of probabilities is
written P(Yt |Xt). In matrix notation the form of both P(Xt |Xt−1)
and P(yt |Xt) is given by:
(
p 1 − p
1 − p p
)
where p is between 0 and 1 and the values for p in P(Xt |Xt−1)
and P(yt |Xt) are different. Representing the parameters this way
assumes that there is symmetry in the underlying environment.
This representation assumes that the probability of a switch from
one environmental state to the other is the same whichever of the
two states the environment is in initially. It also assumes that if
one response type is rewarded with a set probability in one envi-
ronmental state then the other response is rewarded with the same
probability in the other state. The probabilities are considered to
be parameters which are fit to the behavior of the participants.
The HMM assumes that the participants estimate these two
sets of probabilities and that they do so quickly enough that they
can be considered to be constants. It also assumes that it is not
necessary to estimate the two different experimental levels of feed-
back validity and that participants do not realize that switches
only occur at 30 trial intervals.
If we have values, or estimates, for the probabilities of
the environment being in each possible state after t trials,
P(Xt, y1, . . . , yt), then we can incorporate the probability of a
switch in state P(Xt |Xt−1) to give an estimate for the probabili-
ties for each state at trial t + 1 which can be used to inform our
responses. When an outcome is observed, the probabilities can be
updated using the probabilities of the outcome actually observed
given each hidden state, P(yt |Xt). This gives a process which can
be used at each time step and only requires the probability distri-
bution for X to be stored. Figure 8 shows the relationship between
the variables in the HMM.
To show this process formally, we take the joint probabil-
ity distribution at trial t for X with all the known observations
y1, . . . , yt , written P(Xt, y1, . . . , yt−1, yt), and use the definition
of conditional probability to write
P(Xt , y1, . . . , yt−1, yt) = P(yt |Xt, y1, . . . , yt−1)P(Xt , y1, . . . , yt−1). (1)
But yt depends only on Xt so
P(yt |Xt, y1, . . . , yt−1) = P(yt |Xt). (2)
Substituting Equation (2) into (1) gives
P(Xt, y1, . . . , yt−1, yt) = P(yt |Xt)P(Xt, y1, . . . , yt−1). (3)
Now we introduce variable Xt−1 because we know that





t−1, y1, . . . , yt−1) (4)
where i takes values 0 and 1. Using the definition of conditional
probability, Equation (4) can be re-written to give
P(Xt, y1, . . . , yt−1) =
∑
i
P(Xt |xit−1)P(xit−1, y1, . . . , yt−1).
(5)
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FIGURE 8 | Graphical representation of our hidden Markov model
(HMM). The environmental state at trial t is denoted by Xt and its value
depends only on its value at the previous trial. The outcome is represented
by Yt and depends only on Xt .
Now Equation (5) can be substituted in to Equation (3) to give
P(Xt, y1, . . . , yt) = P(yt |Xt)
∑
i
P(Xt |xit−1)P(xit−1, y1, . . . , yt−1).
(6)
The left hand side in Equation (6) is now written in terms of its
value on the previous trial when combined with known proba-
bilities. To begin the process, it is assumed that there is an equal
probability of X being in either of the two possible states.
4.2.2.2. Hidden Markov model with volatility. The work of
Behrens et al. (2007) led to our hidden Markov model with
volatility (VOL). Being based on a hidden Markov model,
this model shares some features with the HMM described
above but makes different assumptions about the nature of the
environment.
In the VOL model, as in the HMM, the outcome at a particu-
lar trial depends only on the value of a hidden state at that trial.
In this case the hidden state, X represents the probability that a
type 2 response will be rewarded. As X represents a probability,
it must have values between 0 and 1. For computation, X was
treated as a discrete random variable by taking 49 equally dis-
tributed points in the 0, 1 interval. Responses can be based on
the mean, or expected value, of the probability distribution over
X, that is the probability that X takes each of its possible values.
As in the HMM, the value of X depends on its previous value,
but in the VOL model, X also depends on the value of a second
hidden variable, V , representing the volatility of the environment,
which was also treated as a discrete random variable taking values
between 0 and 1 in the same way as X. The volatility, V , depends
on its previous value and that of a parameter K. The parameter
K is a representation of the degree of confidence in the estimate
for volatility. The relationships between the variables in the VOL
model are shown in Figure 9.
The equations for updating probabilities for the VOL model
follow in a similar way to those for the HMM. For transi-
tions from one trial to the next, there are sets of probabilities
P(Vt |Vt−1, K) and P(Xt |Xt−1, Vt) for transitions of Vt and Xt ,
respectively. In this case the joint probability to consider is




Xt, Vt, K, y1, . . . , yt
) = P(yt |Xt) P(Xt, Vt, K, y1, . . . , yt−1). (7)
FIGURE 9 | Graphical representation of our VOL model based on the
work of Behrens et al. (2007). The variable, X represents the probability of
a type 2 response being rewarded and the volatility, V determines the
probability of X taking a value unrelated to its current one. The parameter,
K is a measure of trust in the estimated value of the volatility.
Now we can introduce and sum out over Xt−1 as before to give
P
(
Xt, Vt, K, y1, . . . , yt









xit−1, Vt, K, y1, . . . , yt−1
)
.
Now we need to also sum out over Vt−1 in a similar way, giving
P
(
















t−1, K, y1, . . . , yt−1
)
.
Equation (9) gives an expression for P(Xt, Vt, K, y1, . . . , yt) in
terms of its value on the previous trial.
Following the ideas of Behrens et al. (2007), we used a beta
distribution, with a mean of the old value of X, to determine the
probability distribution for X at the next time step. Also moti-
vated by Behrens et al. (2007), we used a normal distribution
to determine the probability distribution for Y . The actual dis-
tributions used for transition matrices and initial distributions
were based on our previous investigation (Duffin, 2011) into
replicating the behavior of the model of Behrens et al. (2007).
4.3. PROBABILITIES FOR ACTIONS
The learning models give a predicted value or probability for
making a particular response at each trial, this can be consid-
ered to be a belief at trial t, B(t). For the UNC model, the belief
is a value for making each button press, given the color that is
displayed, for the other models, the belief is based on making a
type 1 response. People do not always respond in accordance with
the underlying belief, so a softmax rule is often used to select the
action (Daw et al., 2006). A softmax rule varies the amount of
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randomization of responses according to the difference between
the beliefs in the two options. A temperature parameter, T, is used
to control how much randomization is used. A low temperature
gives a high probability of choosing the action with the highest
belief, even when the beliefs are quite close. A high temperature
results in mainly random responses, giving probabilities close to
0.5 for each of the actions, for the models which have only two
actions. Using the softmax rule and given a belief B(t) in a type 1







T + e 1−B(t)T
.
As there were only two possible actions, the probability of making
a type 2 response was given by 1 − P(t).
For each of the models apart from the uncoupled and standard
reinforcement learning models (UNC and RL), each participant
was assumed to have two different temperature parameters, for
after positive or negative feedback. When a participant failed to
respond in the allowed time, we assumed that the previous belief
value would be remembered and that the temperature parameter
applied would be that used after a loss.
4.4. FITTING PARAMETERS
For each model, a set of suitable parameters for that model and a
sequence of outcomes observed by an individual participant, the
process described above can be used to calculate a probability for
each response type at each trial. The full joint probability of the
data given a set of parameters for a participant is given by the
product of the probability of each response actually made. This
assumes that given an underlying model, each response is inde-
pendent of each other. The likelihood of a set of parameters given
data is defined to be the probability of the data given parameters.
For each participant we took the sum of the log likelihood for
each response actually taken to give the total log likelihood of the
parameters. Trials in which a participant failed to respond were
not included in the log likelihood calculations. We found param-
eters to maximize the likelihood, for each participant and model,
by using the search function fmincon in Matlab to minimize
the negative of the log likelihood. Parameters were constrained
according to the model. For each model we allowed temperature
parameters to take any value greater than or equal to 0.01. For
the reinforcement learning models, we allowed the learning rate
to take values between 0.0001 and 1 inclusive. For the HMM,
the probability parameters took values between 0.00001 and 0.5
inclusive.
The parameter fitting process was done for each participant
and model and gave a set of best fit parameters and a log
likelihood value for those parameters for that participant and
model.
4.5. COMPARING MODELS
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is used to take into account
the number of parameters and is given by
BIC = −2 log L + k log N (10)
where L is the likelihood, k is the number of parameters in the
model, N is the number of data points and natural logarithms are
used. Lower BIC values imply a better fit to the data.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Elaine Duffin is funded by an EPSRC Doctoral Training Grant.
Amy Bland was funded by an ESRC studentship.
REFERENCES
Behrens, T., Woolrich, M., Walton, M., and Rushworth, M. (2007). Learning the
value of information in an uncertain world. Nat. Neurosci. 10, 1214–1221. doi:
10.1038/nn1954
Bland, A., and Schaefer, A. (2011). Electrophysiological correlates of decision
making under varying levels of uncertainty. Brain Res. 1417, 55–66. doi:
10.1016/j.brainres.2011.08.031
Bland, A., and Schaefer, A. (2012). Different varieties of uncertainty in human
decision-making. Front. Neurosci. 6:85. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2012.00085
Botvinick, M., Niv, Y., and Barto, A. (2009). Hierarchically organized behavior
and its neural foundations: a reinforcement learning perspective. Cognition 113,
262–280. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2008.08.011
Charness, G., and Levin, D. (2005). When optimal choices feel wrong: a labo-
ratory study of bayesian updating, complexity, and affect. Am. Econ. Rev. 95,
1300–1309. doi: 10.1257/0002828054825583
Cohen, J., McClure, S., and Yu, A. (2007). Should I stay or should I go? How the
human brain manages the trade-off between exploitation and exploration. Phil.
Trans. R. Soc. B 362, 933–942. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2007.2098
Daw, N., O’Doherty, J., Dayan, P., Seymour, B., and Dolan, R. (2006). Cortical
substrates for exploratory decisions in humans. Nature 441, 876–879. doi:
10.1038/nature04766
Duffin, E. (2011). Decision Making in Uncertain Situations. M.Sc. thesis, University
of Leeds.
Frank, M. (2005). Dynamic dopamine modulation in the basal ganglia: a neuro-
computational account of cognitive deficits in medicated and non-medicated
parkinsonism. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 17, 51–72. doi: 10.1162/0898929052880093
Frank, M., Moustafa, A., Haughey, H., Curran, T., and Hutchison, K. (2007).
Genetic triple dissociation reveals multiple roles for dopamine in rein-
forcement learning. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 104, 16311–16316. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0706111104
Gerfen, C. (1992). The neostriatal mosaic: multiple levels of compartmental
organization in the basal ganglia. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 15, 285–320. doi:
10.1146/annurev.ne.15.030192.001441
Guitart-Masip, M., Huys, Q., Fuentemilla, L., Dayan, P., Duzel, E., and
Dolan, R. (2012). Go and no-go learning in reward and punishment:
interactions between affect and effect. Neuroimage 62, 154–166. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.04.024
Hampton, A., Bossaerts, P., and O’Doherty, J. (2006). The role of the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex in abstract state-based inference during decision making in
humans. J. Neurosci. 26, 8360–8367. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1010-06.2006
Ito, M., and Doya, K. (2009). Validation of decision-making models and analysis
of decision variables in the rat basal ganglia. J. Neurosci. 29, 9861–9874. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.6157-08.2009
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, values, and frames. Am. Psychol.
39, 341–350. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.39.4.341
Kravitz, A. V., Tye, L. D., and Kreitzer, A. C. (2012). Distinct roles for direct and
indirect pathway striatal neurons in reinforcement. Nat. Neurosci. 15, 816–818.
doi: 10.1038/nn.3100
Lewandowsky, S., and Farrell, S. (2011). Computational Modeling in Cognition
Principles and Practice. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc.
Mars, R., Shea, N., Kolling, N., and Rushworth, M. (2012). Model-based analyses:
promises, pitfalls, and example applications to the study of cognitive control.
Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 65, 252–267. doi: 10.1080/17470211003668272
Matsumoto, M., and Hikosaka, O. (2009). Two types of dopamine neuron dis-
tinctly convey positive and negative emotional signals. Nature 459, 837–841.
doi: 10.1038/nature08028
Payzan-LeNestour, E., and Bossaerts, P. (2011). Risk, unexpected uncertainty, and
estimation uncertainty: Bayesian learning in unstable settings. PLoS Comput.
Biol. 7:e1001048. doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001048
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience February 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 30 | 12
Duffin et al. Reward and punishment in decisions
Samson, R., Frank, M., and Fellous, J. (2010). Computational models of reinforce-
ment learning: the role of dopamine as a reward signal. Cogn. Neurodyn. 4,
91–105. doi: 10.1007/s11571-010-9109-x
Schultz, W. (1998). Predictive reward signal of dopamine neurons. J. Neurophysiol.
80, 1–27.
Shanks, D., Tunney, R., and McCarthy, J. (2002). A re-examination of probabil-
ity matching and rational choice. J. Behav. Decis. Making 15, 233–250. doi:
10.1002/bdm.413
Sutton, R., and Barto, A. (1998). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Taylor, E. G., Landy, D. H., and Ross, B. H. (2012). The effect of explana-
tion in simple binary decision tasks. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 65, 1361–1375. doi:
10.1080/17470218.2012.656664
Tom, S., Fox, C., Trepel, C., and Poldrack, R. (2007). The neural basis of loss
aversion in decision-making under risk. Science 315, 515–518. doi: 10.1126/sci-
ence.1134239
Vulkan, N. (2000). An economist’s perspective on probability matching. J. Econ.
Surv. 14, 101–118. doi: 10.1111/1467-6419.00106
Wilson, R., and Niv, Y. (2012). Inferring relevance in a changing world. Front. Hum.
Neurosci. 5:189. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2011.00189
Yechiam, E., and Hochman, G. (2013a). Loss-aversion or loss-attention: the
impact of losses on cognitive performance. Cogn. Psychol. 66, 212–231. doi:
10.1016/j.cogpsych.2012.12.001
Yechiam, E., and Hochman, G. (2013b). Losses as modulators of attention: review
and analysis of the unique effects of losses over gains. Psychol. Bull. 139,
497–518. doi: 10.1037/a0029383
Yu, A., and Dayan, P. (2005). Uncertainty, neuromodulation, and attention. Neuron
46, 681–692. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2005.04.026
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 04 October 2013; accepted: 04 February 2014; published online: 21 February
2014.
Citation: Duffin E, Bland AR, Schaefer A and de Kamps M (2014) Differential effects
of reward and punishment in decision making under uncertainty: a computational
study. Front. Neurosci. 8:30. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2014.00030
This article was submitted to Decision Neuroscience, a section of the journal Frontiers
in Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2014 Duffin, Bland, Schaefer and de Kamps. This is an open-access
article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
(CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided
the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
www.frontiersin.org February 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 30 | 13
